Mohrhoff's use of the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz (ABL) rule for time-symmetric objective probabilities, especially as related to
counterfactual statements about possible intervening measurements, is inappropriate. The ABL rule was formulated on the assumption that such intervening measurements are actually made, and would therefore correspond to what Mohrhoff is calling "subjective" probabilities.
Ulrich Mohrhoff (1999) makes an interesting distinction between "subjective" and "objective" probabilities in quantum mechanics. However, his use of the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz (ABL) rule for time-symmetric objective probabilities, especially as related to counterfactual statements about possible intervening measurements, is inappropriate. (See ABL 1964).
The ABL rule was formulated on the assumption that such intervening measurements are actually made, and would therefore correspond to what Mohrhoff is calling "subjective" probabilities.
A more appropriate conditional probability in the context of Mohroff's discussion would be the generalized quantum mechanical conditional probability for an event C k given that it is preceded and followed by events A 1 and B, respectively. This is
However, the above does not always function as a true "conditional probability" in the Kolmogorov sense (cf. Griffiths 1996) .
As has been discussed at length in Kastner (1999a,b,c) and elsewhere 1 , ABL probabilities have to be handled with care and are problematic when applied to counterfactual situations. (1) is not equal to the ABL rule unless one further assumes that there is no "interference" between probabilities for different possible sequences corresponding to outcomes C i , i.e., that for i = j,
However, there is no way to ensure that this condition holds if one is considering hypothetical measurements that have not been performed.
In addition, Mohrhoff's definition of a counterfactual statement as a "contrary-to-fact conditional" is not consistent with the standard understanding of such a statement (cf. Lewis 1973) . A "contrary-to-fact conditional" could be merely a material conditional with a false antecedent, such as:
"If it is raining and not raining, I am on Mars." Such material conditionals are vacuously true.
A counterfactual is a more complex kind of logical statement involving modal logic, the essence of which is not captured by a definition in terms of an ordinary material conditional.
